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tics and Concert diplomacy guide and direct Great Power behavior in accordance with the established rules of the game; Great Powers either conform to the institutional rules and norms or risk suffering the consequences for noncompliance.
Other issues hindering resolution of the debate lie within neoliberal institutionalism itself. For one thing, the perspective's assumptions are not delineated clearly from its hypotheses. For example, in International Institutions and State Power, Keohane (1989:2-3) posits that the neoliberal institutionalist perspective is "relevant to an international system only if two key conditions pertain. First, the actors must have some mutual interests.... [Second,] variations in the degree of institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behavior." Keohane (1989:5-6) also argues that international institutions "are important for states' actions in part because they affect the incentives facing states,... [and] have constitutive as well as regulative aspects: they help define how interests are defined and how actions are interpreted." Although Keohane's writings remain the clearest exposition of the perspective, it is still difficult to determine (1) if institutions matter, and the perspective will tell us how and why, or (2) if institutions sometimes matter, and the perspective will tell us when.
A second issue arises from neoliberal institutionalism's inconsistency regarding the influence of international institutions. Although significant causal weight is attributed to "variations in the institutionalization of world politics," the claim is also made that institutional effectiveness is "not necessarily correlated with institutionalization" (Keohane 1989:2, 6). To reconcile these statements, neoliberal institutionalists must maintain-again using Keohane's (1989:2, 7) words-that institutions that are "of relatively modest significance in world politics" can and do "exert significant effects on the behavior of governments," an apparent contradiction.
Despite these questions about the core of neoliberal institutionalist thought, the perspective has gained much attention from international relations scholars. In several issue-areas-including environmental treaty compliance, shipping, air transport, telecommunications and postal service regimes, NATO conventional force levels, and economic sanctions-neoliberal institutionalism appears to provide a persuasive explanation of international relations (see, for example, Duffield 1992 Duffield , 1995 Martin 1992a; Mitchell 1994a Mitchell , 1994b Zacher 1996) . International institutions, these writers claim, can move states toward cooperation, keep them there, and exert profound effects on state choices (see also, Young 1989 Young , 1992 ; Risse-Kappen 1995, 1996; Wallander and Keohane 1995). Perhaps the optimistic spirit of the neoliberal institutionalist school is justified.
Mearsheimer's "False Promise" Claim
The neoliberal challenge to the realist understanding of world politics has continued to gain momentum despite a strong realist counterattack in the late 1980s that focused on how an emphasis on relative gains could inhibit international cooperation (Waltz 1979:105; Grieco 1988a Grieco , 1988b Grieco , 1990 Grieco , 1993 . Attempting to stem this tide and reclaim the high ground for neorealism, Mearsheimer (1994/95:7) maintained that the neoliberal institutionalists have overstated their case and that, in fact, institutions "have no independent effect on state behavior."
Mearsheimer waged a two-prong attack against neoliberals. First, he reiterated Grieco's argument that neoliberal institutionalists underestimate the barriers to cooperation in the anarchic international system, in particular the inhibiting effect of relative-gains concerns. In brief, the claim is made that without a higher power, states must worry about any state gaining a relative advantage through cooperation, because "today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war" (Grieco 1990 (Wendt 1995) , and those sympathetic to neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane and Martin 1995; see also Ruggie 1995) . Keohane and Martin (1995:40) asked: "How are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions, if such institutions are lacking in significance?" Dismissing Mearsheimer's answer that policymakers investing in institutions are ideologically blinded, they placed the burden of proof on neorealists to show that policymakers have suffered from such delusions. At the same time, they acknowledged that neoliberal institutionalist scholarship in the past has underemphasized the distributional concerns arising from cooperation. Keohane and Martin (1995:45-46), however, claimed that "distributional conflict may render institutions more important .... Far from leading to the conclusion that institutions are not significant in world politics, the relative-gains debate has led us to understand yet another pathway through which they substantially influence the course of international relations" (emphasis in original). In addition, they contested Mearsheimer's argument that institutionalist theory suffers from a lack of empirical support by citing several key studies on its behalf. But Keohane and Martin (1995:50) Martin (1995:51) concluded that the neoliberal institutionalist "research program" is "promising," especially when compared to "the extant alternatives."
We disagree with Keohane and Martin's conclusion. A competitive "realist" alternative has been overlooked in this ongoing debate. Mearsheimer has made an impressive case against international institutions, but he has taken a narrow neorealist view that ignores arguments advanced by earlier, pre-Waltzian realists. Although traditional realists did not develop a full-blown theory of institutions, they had many insights on the subject. The challenge is to reassert these insights and merge them with elements of neorealism to form a coherent whole. First, however, we must clearly distinguish traditional realism from neorealism.
Traditional Realism and Neorealism: Similarities and Differences
Although there are numerous divisions within the realist tradition, all realists subscribe to four assumptions that are held to be the key tenets of the paradigm (see Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1985; Gilpin 1986 Gilpin , 1996 This assumption most centrally distinguishes realism from liberalism. As Andrew Moravcsik (1993:7-8) has written, liberalism assumes that the fundamental actors in politics are "autonomous individuals and private groups differentiated by their variable interests and resource endowments." In the contemporary world, the primary "conflict group" is the nation-state, leading many realists simply to assert that "states are the major actors in world affairs" (Grieco 1990:3; see also There is no "higher power" to enforce agreements made between, or to keep the peace among, nation-states. Thus, states ultimately must rely upon themselves to ensure their survival.
Assumption Three: the nature of international interaction is essentially conflictual.
In the words of Nicholas Spykman (1942:12), "A world without struggle would be a world in which life had ceased to exist." For some realists, conflict is inevitable because of the imperfectibility of human nature and the constant scarcity of material resources, markets, and social goods (Niebuhr 1932 (Niebuhr , 1944 Morgenthau 1946 Morgenthau , 1948 . Other realists locate the source of international conflict in the anarchic structure of the international system, which causes constant uncertainty about others' intentions and creates the security dilemma (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1986 :304; see also Jervis 1986; Schweller 1996). Still other realists derive the ubiquity of conflict directly from anarchy and so do not label it an assumption (Grieco 1990:4). As Helen Milner (1991 Milner ( , 1992 ; see also Wendt 1992; Mercer 1995; Schweller 1996) has pointed out, however, the conflictual nature of politics may not be as clearly derivative of anarchy as some authors have suggested; thus, it is included here as an assumption of the realist paradigm.
Assumption Four: power is the fundamental feature of international politics.
The absence of a formal international authority and world government means that when all else fails, military force is the final and legitimate arbiter of disputes among states. Because "war lurks in the background of international politics" (Carr 1946:109) , "for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival" (Waltz 1959:210) . In the final analysis, power is the basis for securing any state aim, whether it seeks world mastery or simply to be left alone. There is, as Reinhold Niebuhr (1932:42) has put it, "no possibility of drawing a sharp line between the will-to-live and the will-to-power." This logic also lies behind the influence-maximizing assumption adopted by Fareed Zakaria (1995) .
Disagreements within the realist tradition arise from basic philosophical differences, from placing emphasis on different assumptions or, more often, from vary-ing interpretations of the preceding assumptions. The major division within realism is between traditional realism and neorealism: the former described in the writings of E. H. Carr (1946) , Hans Morgenthau (1946 Morgenthau ( , 1948 , Arnold Wolfers (1962), and Robert Gilpin (1981 Gilpin ( , 1986 Gilpin ( , 1996 ; the latter in works by Waltz (1979 Waltz ( , 1986 Waltz ( , 1993 , Christopher Layne (1993 Layne ( , 1994 , and Mearsheimer (1990 Mearsheimer ( , 1994 .4
Six major differences divide traditional realists and neorealists. First, there is a philosophical disagreement over the discipline(s) in which realist theory is grounded. Traditional realism is rooted in sociology and history (with some attention to psychology, theology, and economics); neorealism borrows most heavily from microeconomics (Kapstein 1995:771; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Priess 1996b). Second, traditional realists view power as an end in itself; states can seek to maximize power as well as security (Gilpin 1996:6) . Neorealists believe that security is the highest end (Waltz 1979:126) . Third, the basic causal variables are not the same for traditional realists and neorealists. Traditional realists posit that power and the interests of states drive behavior; neorealists examine only anarchy and the distribution of capabilities.
The fourth and fifth differences center on the meaning of "capability." Traditional realism is a theory of foreign policy, focusing on the relative distribution (balances and imbalances) of capabilities between specific states or coalitions of states, not on the systemwide distribution of capabilities or the polarity of the system. As Morgenthau (1948:137) has written, "The historically most important manifestation of the balance of power . . . is to be found . . . in the relations between one nation or alliance and another alliance." Traditional realists understand capability to be neither a unit nor a structural attribute but rather a relationship between states, for example, the potential outcome of military conflict (Snyder 1996) . Seen as a product of unit interactions, capability is a process variable that describes the effects of relative dyadic or coalitional power disparities on interstate behavior and strategic interactions.
In contrast, neorealism is a theory of international politics,5 focusing on the systemwide distribution of capabilities, that is, the polarity of the system as measured by the number of Great Powers, not the relative inequalities of power among them. Neorealists conceptualize capability as a unit-level property, indicated by a state's inventory of military forces and those resources that can be transformed into military forces; this concept is then merely raised to the system level (see Waltz 1979:126; Mearsheimer 1994/95:10). Such a process yields the main explanatory variable of neorealism: system polarity-a structural property that is largely ignored by traditional realists (Snyder 1996) . Sixth, the two camps disagree over the meaning of "system." A system refers to "an arrangement of certain components so interrelated as to form a whole" (Klir 1972:1) or "sets of elements standing in interaction" (von Bertalanffy 1968:38). For traditional realists, the international system is composed of units, interactions, and structure. "Interaction is crucial to the concept of system, for without it, the term system has no meaning," as Barry Buzan and his colleagues (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:29) have observed. The inclusion of interaction in the definition of a system allows process variables (for instance, institutions, norms, rules) as well as structural ones to define the nature of world politics and to have an effect on its operation and dynamics (Snyder 1996) . In neorealism, such process variables are 4For a different division of realism into two schools labeled "tragedy" and "evil," see Spirtas (1996) ; see also the analysis of realism in Tellis (1996) . 5Elman (1996) has argued that neorealism can produce theories of foreign policy; for a response to his claim, see Waltz (1996) . not considered system attributes. Although Waltz (1979: 79) defines a system as "composed of structure and of interacting units," his distinction between reductionist theories (based on unit attributes and interactions) and systemic theories (based on structural causes) and "his usage of terms such as 'systems theory' and 'systems level' makes the term system effectively a synonym for structure" (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:28). In Waltz's (1979:79) words, "definitions of structure must leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics of units, their behavior, and their interactions."
Realists on Institutions
In this section, we will build the case for a realist perspective on institutions by reviewing the relationships posited by traditional realists between structure and institutions as well as between interests and institutions. At its core, neorealist theory seeks to explain the effects that different international structures have on state behavior and international politics. Indeed, as Waltz (1986:329) averred, attention to international structures does "tell us a small number of big and important things." As will be discussed below, these structures affect the development and nature of institutional arrangements: unipolar distributions of power tend toward imposed orders; bipolar structures generate spontaneous, informal orders between the two poles and more formal institutional arrangements within the attendant blocs; and multipolar systems engender both imposed and spontaneous orders.
Realists do not deny the veracity of the neoliberal claim that international regimes may be created through negotiated processes (for example, the Concert of Europe under multipolarity). In explaining these kinds of orders, however, realists of all stripes characterize them, not in terms of cooperation to promote the general welfare of states as liberals past and present tend to do, but rather as a form of collusion among powerful oligopolistic actors to serve their perceived interests at the expense of the "others," that is, those states deemed to be outside the elite Great Power club or international "high society." In the eyes of the included Great Powers, concert systems appear as negotiated orders. From the perspective of the excluded powers, these types of institutions are viewed as an imposed order by a few dominant and essentially satisfied actors (Jervis 1983 (Jervis , 1986 ; see also Kissinger 1994).
Building on this notion of institutions as a form of collusion, Edward Mansfield (1995:600; also 1994a) has argued that international institutions are susceptible in varying degrees to capture by specific states and/or special interests within states: "States and interest groups have an incentive to capture international institutions because they can generate power for those that control them. Actors that gain power within an institution have the ability to set its agenda and influence the distribution of benefits and costs among members." States also use institutions to advance their interests through the strategy of "binding," in which a state seeks to exert some control over another state's policies by incorporating it in a web of institutional arrangements. Historian Paul Schroeder (1976) has pointed out that alliances often are designed to restrain or control partners' actions as well as to balance adversaries. Likewise, Grieco (1995:34; 1996:286-289) has posited his "voice opportunities" thesis, according to which "weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules ... will provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger partners." Binding, as a realist strategy, offers rising powers a "place at the table" in an attempt to meet their prestige demands, and it gives them "opportunities for an effective voice" while fostering a renewed sense of legitimacy in the established international order. Binding is consistent with, but more encompassing than, Henry Kissinger's (1979:129) "linkage" strat- Grieco (1993 Grieco ( , 1996 , and Scott Sagan (1994), borrows heavily from Samuel Huntington's (1968:5) Political Order in Changing Societies, particularly its basic premise that the "primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change." Modified structural realists agree with the neoliberal view that a demand exists (now more than ever) for international regimes and institutions, even in the realm of international security. Indeed, Jack Snyder (1991:137, 139) has concluded that the solution to the problem of "security in the changing European order" is "a middle road between the Hobbesian instinct for insulation and the neo-liberal instinct for institutionalized activism."
Mindful of the pernicious effects of international anarchy and of the emerging multipolarity in East Asia and Europe that can make cooperation in the form of institution-building difficult to achieve, modified structural realists posit that international institutions serve four vital functions. First, they help create stability and order by filling "the gap between rising political participation and weak governing institutions" and thereby prevent the spread of praetorian regimes (J. Snyder 1991:136-137). Second, participation, particularly in Western economic institutions, can be offered as a "carrot" in exchange for a strong effort on the part of the 6For a view of binding (or "co-binding") from a liberal perspective, see Deudney (1995 Deudney ( , 1996 Because traditional and modified structural realists acknowledge that outcomes do not always correspond to the actual power distribution among the actors in the system but are instead modified by institutional arrangements, they believe that institutions do indeed matter. Their view contradicts Mearsheimer's (1994/95:49) assertion that institutions "have mattered rather little" in international politics. Moreover, they argue that it is important to examine the disjunction between the actual power distribution and the existing institutional order-the system's prestige and hierarchy. As this disjunction grows with time, it eventually leads to systemic disequilibrium and war, which, in turn, restores some semblance of stability by creating institutions and outcomes that once again reflect the actual power relationships among the major actors (Carr 1946; Gilpin 1981 ).
At a more fundamental level, traditional and modified structural realists believe that institutions matter because even the most rudimentary interactions among states require agreement on, and some shared understanding of, the basic rules of the game.
For this reason, order of almost any kind is preferable to chaos; it is the indispensable cement of all social systems (Niebuhr 1932). As Gilpin (1981:35-36) has observed:
In addition to the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige, the third component of the governance of the international system is a set of rights and rules that govern or at least influence the interactions among states .... Every system of human interaction requires a minimum set of rules and the mutual recognition of rights. The need for rules and rights arises from the basic human condition of scarcity of material resources and the need for order and predictability in human affairs. In order to minimize conflict over the distribution of scarce goods and to facilitate fruitful cooperation among individuals, every social system creates rules and laws for governing behavior. This is as true for international systems as for domestic systems. ... Although the rights and rules governing interstate behavior are to varying degrees based on consensus and mutual interest, the primary foundation of rights and rules is in the power and interests of the dominant groups or states in a social system.... In every social system the dominant actors assert their rights and impose rules on lesser members in order to advance their particular interests.
Interests and Institutions7
Less explicit than the distribution of capabilities, but no less important for the traditional realist's view of institutions, is the role of state interests. Power tells us how much influence a state will have over others; interests tell us when and for what purposes that influence will be used. Power and interests are integrally related; that is, the interests of states are also largely a function of their position in the international system. For instance, an economic hegemon has an overriding interest in an open international trading structure precisely because-given its larger size and more advanced economic development vis-a-vis other states-it stands to gain the most from free trade (Gilpin 1987 capabilities tends to promote revisionist aims among the rising powers. Stable bipolar configurations are likely to lead to the adoption of a status quo orientation by the two poles, resulting in a superpower "condominium" of sorts.
Even though state interests have been a traditional concern of realists, these unit-level variations were excised from the theory by neorealists for the sake of greater parsimony. Neorealism assumes that all states seek to maximize their security and not necessarily their power. As Waltz (1979:126) has observed, "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals such as tranquillity, profit, and power." The notion, however, on which this assertion is based-that prior realist theory erringly posited power-maximizing behavior-is incorrect. Not unlike Wilsonian liberalism, which divided the world into good and bad (democratic and nondemocratic states, respectively), traditional realism distinguishes two types of states: Morgenthau (1948 At issue in the enduring conflict between satisfied and dissatisfied states is the legitimacy of the institutional arrangements or governance structures that define the established international order. In this regard, it is important to recall that "legitimacy," as realists use the term, does not imply justice. As Kissinger (1957:1) writes, legitimacy ... means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy. A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope.
In a legitimate order, even the most dissatisfied states desire only changes within the system, not a change of the system. Adjustments to the status quo are acceptable as long as they are made within the framework of existing institutional arrangements, not at their expense. Before the balance of power could impose its restraints upon the power aspirations of nations through the mechanical interplay of opposing forces, the competing nations had first to restrain themselves by accepting the system of the balance of power as the common framework of their endeavors.... It is this consensus-both child and father, as it were, of common moral standards and a common civilization as well as of common interests-that kept in check the limitless desire for power, potentially inherent, as we know, in all imperialisms, and prevented it from becoming a political actuality. Where such a consensus no longer exists or has become weak and is no longer sure of itself, as in the period starting with the partitions of Poland and ending with the Napoleonic Wars, the balance of power is incapable of fulfilling its function for international stability and national independence.
Although international institutions are inherently tools of conservation and management, they may also facilitate limited change by providing a general framework of rules and rights within which adjustments can be made that leave the status quo essentially intact. The British conceptualized the League of Nations in this way-as a concert-like forum for the inclusive purposes of consultation, conciliation, and compromise between the satisfied and dissatisfied powers (Kissinger 1994:ch. 9). Similarly, but in a less formal institutional setting, the rules of compensations and indemnities are modes of operation of the balance of power for the purpose of making territorial changes and payments for services or losses without disturbing the relative distribution of power in the system (Wight 1978:ch. 17; Schroeder 1994:6-7).
Because international institutions, according to traditional realists, tend to promote the interests of the powerful at the expense of the weak, they ultimately derive their authority less from shared views of justice and morality than from the superior power of the ruling, status quo state or states. Traditional realists are not, however, suggesting that international order depends at all times on the exercise of brute force or coercive power by the hegemon. Although imposed at its creation, the existing order and its associated institutional arrangements can, nonetheless, assume-or come to assume-a significant measure of legitimacy among the subordinate states. Acceptance by the ruled can arise as a result of either (1) the state as a whole deriving tangible benefits from the hegemon's rule, or (2) elites within the secondary state benefiting materially from the hegemonic order or becoming socialized into the hegemon's value system (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).
Despite the hegemon's efforts (benign or otherwise), powerful revisionist states eventually emerge; and, as Gilpin (1981:ch. 3) has argued, uneven power growth among states drives hegemonic wars by altering the costs and benefits of territorial, political, and economic expansion to rising, dissatisfied powers. At a minimum, the rising power will issue demands for, inter alia, a "place at the table"-a commitment from the established powers to reshape what it perceives as adverse global norms. The revisionist power, by seeking this new level of prestige, is acting out its desire to voice its concerns in international institutions commensurate with its growth in relative power. Far from being unimportant or epiphenomenal, then, as neorealists like Mearsheimer have claimed, international institutions are the "brass ring," so to speak; the right to create and control them is precisely what the most powerful states have fought for in history's most destructive wars.
The reader should note that not all rising powers are dissatisfied with the status quo order. "Whether a state is revisionist or status quo is not an endogenous function of the distribution of capabilities" (Schweller 1993 :86); a state's type is not determined simply by its power position within the system. Indeed, that a rising power would ever be dissatisfied with the existing order is rather puzzling, given that, by definition, it is doing better than the established powers under their rules and institutional arrangements. One might say that the rising power is beating the established powers at their own game. This apparent discrepancy between actual performance and satisfaction can be reconciled, however, by simply positing that the dissatisfied power believes it is outperforming its competitors despite the shackles that the established powers have placed on it; the assumption is made that it would rise even faster under its own rules.
Traditional realists view system stability as a function of the relative strengths of revisionist and status quo forces. When the forces defending the status quo are stronger than the dissatisfied state(s), the system is stable. This situation is most likely in the immediate aftermath of a major-power war that ends in decisive victory for one party. In contrast, when the revisionist state or coalition is stronger than the forces defending the status quo, the system eventually undergoes transformation. Institutions serve to widen the web of the established order as created by the most powerful, status quo state or coalition.
A Model of International Politics Based on Traditional Realism
Recently, Buzan and Glenn Snyder have proposed that considerations of state-tostate interactions be added to Waltz's systems theory as a third level of analysis, residing between neorealism's unit and structural levels. Buzan's (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993:ch. 4) "interactions level" captures a systemwide set of variables that are neither structural nor unit level in character and that affect the "interaction capacity"-the absolute quality of technological and societal capabilities-of the system as a whole. Concurring with, but slightly amending, Buzan's idea, Snyder (1996:172) has added a "relationship" level that consists of static situational ele-ments (such as alignments and alliances, common and conflicting interests, and capabilities and interdependence) and establishes the context of interaction rather than the action itself. This section builds on this pathbreaking work and advances a model that combines the theoretical insights of neorealism with those of traditional realism. The model includes traditional realism's concern for state attributes and state-to-state interactions as separate causal levels of analysis that reciprocally affect each other. These subsystemic levels of analysis are, in turn, conditioned by the structure of the system, which constrains and enables state behavior and interstate relationships but, as Waltz has suggested, does not determine outcomes. By incorporating state-level attributes and interactions, the model generates more precise explanations and can offer more determinate predictions than are possible from a purely structural form of realism. Governing involves at least three interrelated processes: (1) the way power is exercised, (2) the type of order that is produced, and (3) the degree of institutionalization that prevails. With respect to the first process, power appears to be exercised in three generic ways: as naked power, as influence, and as management. These three ways of governing are distinguished, inter alia, their core values. Specifically, naked power relies on brute force or coercion, that is, the threat of severe sanctions for noncompliance; influence rests on legitimacy, authority, and socialization; management is centered around administrative capacity, skill, and directorship (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950:ch. 5).
The second process focuses on the type of order produced. Oran Young (1986:110) identifies three generic mechanisms through which social order can arise: negotiation; imposition; and spontaneous, uncoordinated action. Negotiated orders are the deliberately intended product of voluntary bargaining among roughly equal, rational egoists (self-interested utility maximizers). Imposed orders are also deliberately designed, but they are intended to advance the interests of one or a few dominant actors and, as such, typically do not require the explicit consent of subordinate actors. Spontaneous orders arise without conscious coordination or deliberate purpose and do not involve explicit consent on the part of the subjects; they are the unintended, although often useful, consequences of the coaction of actors seeking their own selfish interests. (For a more extensive discussion, see Young 1982) .
The third process, and the one most important to our present concerns, revolves around the degree of institutionalization (low, moderate, or high) that characterizes the system. Institutions can be formal or informal; they are the sets of rights and rules governing interstate behavior and world politics. A highly institutionalized system is one in which formal organizations have the capacity, skill, and authority to play a major role in managing the system; the rules and rights governing the system are formal, explicit, and based on shared understandings among the major actors.
Although all combinations of these three processes are possible, certain permutations seem more logical and more probable than others. The exercise of naked power is likely to create an imposed order characterized by low institutionalization, as in malevolent hegemony and imperialism. Influence as a means of governing often combines aspects of negotiated and spontaneously generated orders and tends to require a moderate to high level of institutionalization, as in benevolent hegemony, bipolar condominium, Great Power spheres of influence, and balanceof-power politics. Management is the product of negotiated orders and, as a result, usually entails a high level of formal or informal institutionalization, as illustrated by collective security and the Concert system.
Institutions under Unipolarity
What happens to international institutions when the international system is dominated by one power? Using the variety of levels and variables just outlined and material from the literature on unipolarity, what would the model lead us to expect? When the international system is ruled by a hegemon, governance is probably accomplished through naked power and the imposition of rules or by means of a negotiated order. Which order arises and how it is maintained will depend primarily on whether the hegemon assumes the role of a liberal leader or a nonliberal despot.
Whether the hegemon imposes or negotiates the institutional arrangements governing the international system, it will attempt to establish its dominance in several issue-areas and to set up a world order based on global rules and rights conducive to its interests. Such institutions, although associated with the hegemon's order and backed by its power, may, even so, exhibit a dramatic independent effect on state behavior. As the hegemon declines-which naturally occurs given the law of uneven growth and environmental, international, and domestic changes (Gilpin 1981:ch. 2)-it comes to rely increasingly on these institutions to maintain its position and delay its fall from dominant status. Institutions under unipolarity, therefore, are most effective at the beginning of a hegemon's reign but continue to exert influence on international politics during hegemonic decline until a revisionist challenger gains the strength and motivation to overthrow the established order (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984) .
When the hegemon is not liberal, it creates regimes "by possessing the effective capacity or power to impose institutional arrangements on the group regardless of the preferences of the other members" (Young 1986:110). As imposed orders, such hegemonic institutional arrangements are often underdeveloped, given that they do not involve cooperation but rather submission and adaptation to the stronger power's will. Imposed hegemonic orders based on coercion and brute force are generally perceived as illegitimate by the subordinate states. Consequently, they tend to be costly and inefficient.
Hegemons Still another way that a hegemonic order can gain legitimacy or acceptance among the ruled is through a process of socialization in which the hegemon, by manipulating material incentives, successfully transmits its values to secondary states. This "third face of power," or "power of socialization" view, is consistent with the Weberian concept of "legitimate domination": "Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy" (Weber as quoted in Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990:289; see also Smith 1986:ch. 2).
Building on Weber's insight and the traditional realist view that material power is the source of international authority, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990:284) find that "when socialization does occur, it comes about primarily in the wake of the coercive exercise of power. That is, socialization is distinct from, but does not occur independently of, power manifest as the manipulation of material incentives." Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:315) conclude, however, that hegemonic coercion and material inducements are necessary but not sufficient catalysts for socialization to occur:
. . . the process of socialization can lead to outcomes that are not explicable simply in terms of the exercise of coercive power. Socialization affects the nature, the costs, and the longevity of the interactions that shape hegemonic systems. In particular, socialization leads to the legitimation of hegemonic power in a way that allows international order to be manipulated without the constant threat of coercion.
Whichever method is chosen, the hegemon can take full advantage of its exalted position only by solving the paradox presented by its own strength: a hegemon must exert its superior power to influence the behavior of others in a way that achieves its desired ends without, in the process, forcing into existence a counterbalancing coalition. If threat inheres in the hegemon's power regardless of its declared intentions, as some neorealists have suggested (see Layne 1993), then the hegemon's fate is sealed: challengers seeking greater security and autonomy will emerge to balance against it. History tells us, however, that threat is not a necessary derivative of power and that the emergence of powerful states has not always been accompanied by the rise of a challenger or countercoalition. Consider the cases of nineteenth-century Britain, which controlled three-quarters of the world and yet remained in "splendid isolation," as well as the emergence of the United States as a Great Power before World War I without the formation of a balancing alliance (Walt 1985 (Walt , 1987 (Walt , 1988 .
The hegemons that have most successfully navigated their rise to power and established an order consistent with their objectives have been those that most clearly recognized the limits of power as a basis of rule. Of course, power is an important force behind institutional effectiveness. Niebuhr (1946:93) expressed this idea when he observed that one must not fail to recognize "the necessity of coercion for the sake of securing social co-operation." When relied upon and used unwisely, however, naked power will prove ineffective as a means of achieving international organization. Thus, Metternich has been called the "supreme realist" (Kissinger 1957:10). Unlike Napoleon, who believed he could impose universal principles on unwilling subjects simply by the assertion of superior power, Metternich based his diplomacy on the sanctity of treaty relations among states. He worked to restore the disintegrated structure of the eighteenth-century international system, the stability of which rested on limited goals and the claim of legitimacy. In other words, the diplomacy of the realist statesman is dictated by prudence and expediency-knowing what is possible and acting in accordance with the particular situation (Kissinger 1957:ch. 2; see also Kissinger 1994). "We must be gardeners," George Kennan (1954:92) declared, in support of political expediency and against the establishment of rigid legal norms, "and not mechanics in our approach to world affairs."
A realist foreign policy emphasizes persuasion and consensus on legitimate principles rather than on coercion and universalism. Of the realist statesman, Kissinger (1957:326) has written:
His instrument is diplomacy, the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action which reconciles particular aspirations with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on persuasion and not imposition, it presupposes a determinate framework, either through an agreement on a legitimizing principle or, theoretically, through an identical interpretation of power-relationships, although the latter is in practice the most difficult to attain.
Contrary to the popular conception, the "ideal" realist state is not the power-maximizing, malevolent hegemon that attempts to impose its values on others through naked power and eternal crusades. Rather, the ideal is the prudent, benevolent hegemon that understands the limits of coercive power and so promotes legitimacy and emulation of its values while tolerating pluralism and diversity.
Institutions under Bipolarity
When the international system contains two superpowers, the model described here would lead us to expect several different institutional patterns, depending on state interests. Specifically, cooperative, although largely informal, institutional practices are likely to develop spontaneously as unintended by-products of the distribution of power. Let us explicate these propositions in more detail.
Borrowing from Mancur Olson (1965), Waltz (1979:208) has observed that in a bipolar system ... the interest of preeminent powers in the consumption of collective goods is strong enough to cause them to undertake the provision of those goods without being properly paid. They have incentives to act in the interest of the general peace and wider security of nations even though they will be working for the benefit of others as much as for themselves and even though others pay disproportionately small amounts of the costs.... Leading states play leading roles in managing world affairs, and they do this even more so as their number shrinks to two. When one pole in a bipolar system is significantly stronger than the other or believes that dynamic change in the relative balance of power between them is possible, it (or both poles) will seek to achieve hegemonic status. Unlimited revisionist aims of this type exacerbate bipolar conflict and competition, as one pole tries to impose a global order on the other pole, which, in turn and for reasons of self-preservation, resists at all costs. Such an unbalanced, dynamic bipolar system characterized the "pre-mutual assured destruction," post-World War II period and led to intense bipolar competition and periodic crises.
Conversely, when (1) the two poles are roughly equal in military power, (2) this condition of parity is relatively stable, or (3) both poles perceive the situation as such, the drive for hegemony subsides. Under conditions of static and balanced bipolarity, both poles are likely to become satisfied, status quo powers (unable and unwilling to change the established order), and bipolar accommodation and condominium will replace superpower rivalry. Thus, somewhat counterintuitive to the neorealist perspective, the growth in Soviet power during the 1960s and 1970s led not to increased superpower competition and greater cohesion among the Western allies but rather to superpower d6tente and greater intra-alliance conflict (for example, Brandt's Ostpolitik, and the Sino-Soviet split). This reaction occurred because the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the United States during this period, which not only satisfied Soviet prestige and security demands but, more important, enhanced system stability and balance-both of which were reinforced by second-strike nuclear weapons.
At the state-to-state interactions level, when a stable bipolar balance exists, the intensity of the security dilemma decreases; both poles are "concerned less with scoring relative gains and more with making absolute ones" (Waltz 1979:195) . Arms racing gives way to arms control, and crisis management replaces coercive diplomacy. The two poles cooperate to manage the system through the creation of a moderate level of institutionalization and negotiated or tacit "rules of the game" (see, for example, Benjamin Frankel's (1993) analysis of Soviet-U.S. management of nuclear proliferation). At the same time, however, the nonpolar states often view bipolar condominium as an imposed order that carries with it the threat of losing their political autonomy.
In contrast with polar relations, intrabloc relations under bipolarity are governed by formal and explicit institutional arrangements, whether negotiated (as in NATO) or imposed (as in the Warsaw Pact). The most commonly discussed form of institutional cooperation in the realist literature is the military alliance.8 Realists see alliances primarily as responses to threats: the greater the threat, the greater the likelihood of alliance formation and, implicitly, the more cohesive the alliance 8The discussion of alliances is included in this section on bipolarity, rather than in the previous section, because alliances are less prominent in unipolar systems, even though they exist. It should be noted that alliances (at least offensive ones) are qualitatively different from most other international institutions in that they are formed, not to reap the benefits of peaceful cooperation, but rather to reap the benefits of cooperation in making and jointly executing war (see Levy 1981 These extraordinary measures were dictated by a unique security threat induced by the bipolar world structure. In the absence of bipolarity and the Soviet threat, structural realists (including Waltz, Layne, and Mearsheimer) expect relations between the United States and its erstwhile allies to return to a more normal state of affairs, that is, economic, political, and military competition; a concern for relative shifts in power capabilities; and a struggle for supremacy. As Waltz (1993:76) has observed, "Without the shared perception of a severe Soviet threat, NATO would never have been born"; with the disappearance of that threat, "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are" (also see Mearsheimer 1990 Mearsheimer :52, 1994 . In theory, a properly functioning balance-of-power system requires rapid and abrupt switches from amity to enmity among nations. In practice, decisive victories have often converted wartime allies into peacetime adversaries. Why should the end of the Cold War be any different from past history?9 9For a creative, but not entirely convincing, argument (incorporating functionalist, cybernetic, neoliberal institutionalist, and realist elements) that NATO will survive and continue to be important in the post-Cold War era, see Chernoff (1995) .
Perhaps forty-plus years of transatlantic cooperation have forever changed relations among the advanced industrialized democracies. Positing a variant of this view, adherents of the "Clash of Civilizations/West Against the Rest" school predict that a united "West" will persist because of natural affinity, consciousness of their own civilization, and, consistent with realism, a shared common threat from other non-Western civilizations (Huntington 1993 (Huntington , 1996a (Huntington , 1996b Mahbubani 1993 ; Connelly and Kennedy 1994). Similarly, but arising from a liberal foundation, Deudney and Ikenberry (1993/94; Ikenberry 1996) have argued that the West is a unique "industrial liberal" order, likely to persist regardless of recent structural changes. In the eyes of neorealists, however, the idea of the "West" is a mere myth brought into existence by an extremely dangerous, overtly hostile threat from the East; a myth that has outlived its usefulness (see Harries 1993).
In contrast to neorealism, traditional realism suggests an answer for the persistence of an institution beyond the time when its raison d'etre vanishes, such as NATO's endurance into the 1990s. States enter into cooperative arrangements, such as alliances, for reasons of expediency. When the reasons that led to a coalition no longer exist, the alliance begins to disintegrate (Morgenthau 1959; Kennan 1984: 238; Hellmann and Wolf 1993:10-13).10 Traditional realists, however, do not assert, as neorealists do, that all alliances will disintegrate sooner rather than later. Given traditional realism's assumptions that politics are inherently group-based and that group identities on the world stage are not forever fixed (Gilpin 1981: 18; see also Niebuhr 1932 Niebuhr , 1944 Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1946 Morgenthau , 1985 , this theory predicts that some institutions will endure longer than the structural factors or threats that brought them into existence because of a shared sense of "in-group" identity induced by prolonged, intense, and focused threats (Priess 1996b ). The idea of the "West" forged by decades of Cold War competition may, therefore, enable NATO to endure longer than a similar institution without such a sense of shared identity. Even though structural changes and shifts in state interests make the disintegration of alliances and attendant institutions inevitable in the long run (a belief distinguishing this realist account from much of the "West Against the Rest" literature), some institutions will endure longer than neorealism predicts because of the development of shared identities, especially if "in-groups" are maintained by the perception of new "others" (Mercer 1995; Barnett 1996) .
Institutions under Multipolarity
What if the system has many poles? What kind of international institutions result in a multipolar system, and do the characteristics of the units or their interactions influence the nature of these institutional arrangements? Under multipolarity, the model described here predicts that international institutions could take a variety of forms-most, but not all, of which will be ad hoc and shallow with little or no influence on state behavior. The variance in the degree of institutionalization in the international system will depend on the character of the units, the particular type of multipolar structure in which they are embedded, and several interactionlevel variables-in particular, the degree of inequality and of differential growth rates among the poles as well as the offense-defense balance in military technology (see Christensen and Snyder 1990) .
When there is an even distribution of power among the multiple poles (each holds an approximately equal percentage share of systemic capabilities) and their growth rates are not widely uneven, the system is unlikely to experience polariza-tion into rival camps for the purpose of managing dangerous imbalances of power. As long as no alliance handicaps exist, such a balanced and stable multipolar system is fertile ground for the development of systemwide international regimes that define the norms and codes governing interstate relations and offer membership to all the Great Powers (Schroeder 1994). Conversely, when there are large imbalances of power among the poles or vastly uneven growth rates, the system will be characterized by a high level of polarization and concern over relative gains and losses, both of which exacerbate the security dilemma and rule out any attempt to construct systemwide institutional orders.
Institutions are most likely to develop and to be effective in a multipolar setting when all the Great Powers are satisfied with the established order. Under this condition, a negotiated order based on management and influence with a moderate to high level of institutionalization would be likely. By definition, status quo states do not require expansion for their security (if they did, they would not be satisfied with the status quo) and, for them, the benefits of peace far outweigh the costs of not engaging in expansion. If each is confident that all the others feel the same way, institutionalized cooperation taking the form of a "Great Power Concert" may develop (Jervis 1983). In such a situation, every pole is willing to forego short-term gains for the long-term benefits of domestic and systemic peace and stability.
Other unit-level factors, such as ideological convergence and cultural similarity, also promote the establishment of security regimes among the Great Powers for the purpose of cooperation in conflict resolution (Miller 1995 At the interaction level, a shared perception among all poles that defense has the advantage over offense-that "it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take" (Jervis 1978:187)-and that defensive weapons and policies are distinct from offensive ones will decrease the security dilemma among major powers and thereby increase the likelihood that security institutions will develop (Glaser 1994/95). Yet, although it is relatively easy to create security regimes under such circumstances, there will be little need for them. Thus, states may opt to forgo cooperative arrangements in favor of individualistic policies. For this reason, the most favorable conditions for the formation of security regimes are cases in which offense has the advantage, and offensive military postures differ from defensive ones, or cases in which offensive measures are indistinguishable from defensive ones, but it is easier to defend than attack. "In either of these worlds the costs or risks of individualistic security policies are great enough to provide status quo powers with incentives to seek security through cooperative means, but the dangers of being taken by surprise by an aggressor are not so great as to discourage the states from placing reliance on joint measures" (Jervis 1983:178).
When some of the Great Powers are perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be revisionist and thus dissatisfied with the established international order, security regimes and institutions will either break down or be less effective, as in the Concert system after 1848 and the League of Nations during the interwar period (Jervis 1986). This logic also applies to regional balances of power. In a multipolar region with powerful revisionist states, institutions will be both sparse and ineffective. Consider the modern Middle East, where there have been a number of revisionist states over the last forty years, and where international institutions (apart from the increasingly powerful institution of statism) have been largely impotent (Ajami 1981; Barnett 1993 Barnett , 1995 Barnett , 1996 . One form of institution in particular, the military alliance, tends to vary widely in effectiveness under multipolarity. Unlike bipolarity, multipolarity allows for myriad alliance patterns among the poles as a result of the greater uncertainty inherent in such a distribution of power and the number of exit choices that states have. Specifically, multipolar alliances are plagued by states' abilities to manipulate partners vis-a-vis other poles-for instance, by chain-ganging and buck-passing. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder (1990) have observed that attention to system structure alone does not allow one to make determinate predictions about which of these strategies will be chosen in any given situation; for these types of predictions, interaction-level variables such as the nature of the offense-defense balance must be included. Multipolar alliances also vary widely in their explicitness. Alliance members must make a trade-off between implicit bonds-which increase states' anxieties concerning abandonment but may lead their partners to honor the alliance (to maintain their reputations)-and explicit bonds-which grant them confidence that the commitments explicated in the agreement will be honored but may entrap them in their allies' adventures (Snyder 1984:473-474 ). Ironically, then, alliances and institutions in general are likely to be least effective when the international system has multiple poles-precisely the distribution of power under which uncertainty and risk make cooperation most necessary.
In summary, multipolar periods historically have been characterized by both minimal and extensive Great Power institutionalization. Because this variation cannot be explained by the neorealist constant of structural polarity, unit-and interaction-level factors must determine the degree of institutionalization that does or does not develop in such systems. Moreover, given the greater number of actors, and thus complexity, in a multipolar system, any significant cooperation that occurs between the Great Powers will require formal and explicit institutionalized arrangements (Lipson 1991) . The Great Powers in a multipolar system cannot engage in effective conflict management and resolution strategies by the tacit rules of spontaneous cooperation; deliberate, conscious negotiation among the poles will be needed for such cooperation to result (Miller 1995:242-243 ).
Trends and Further Research
Neorealism's parsimony has led to excesses such as Mearsheimer's stance on institutions that have left realism without a well-developed model of institutional origins and effectiveness. Most realists, however, understand that institutions can, and sometimes do, matter. The model presented in this article is merely a sketch derived from earlier realists' insights on institutions; far more work remains to be done. This final section briefly describes how this more traditional realist model of international institutions fits into an emerging wave of realist scholarship and suggests some fruitful avenues for future research on international institutions.
Back to Realism 's Roots
This essay is part of a current intellectual movement away from the starker, more rigorous, neorealist model of international politics toward the richer analytic framework of traditional realism. Recent scholarship, in addition to the research already cited in our discussion of modified structural realism, further highlights this trend. One of the authors (Schweller 1996: 92; see also Schweller forthcoming) has observed elsewhere that "differences in state goals-whether states seek the minimum power required for security or additional power for goals other than security-have to be accorded equal consideration with anarchy and the distribution of capabilities." Likewise, Stephen Walt's (1985, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1996a) balance-of-threat theory incorporates the traditional realist concern for state interests and intentions. Even Grieco's (1990:45) well-known argument on relative gains, a neorealist cause c6elbre, relies on the "k-factor" that represents a state's "sensitivity to gaps in payoffs," a function of the amity or enmity between states. Although neorealism has been of immense value, the complexity of contemporary world politics requires a systems theory that can incorporate the characteristics of states, their interactions, and a more comprehensive view of system structure than is captured by the concept of polarity. This need for a more elaborate theory does not mean, as many liberals and constructivists have suggested, that realist theory is dead and should be buried (see, for example, Kegley 1993; Lebow 1994). To the contrary, realism contains all the elements necessary to construct a theory of world politics applicable to the twenty-first century; it is a theory, as William Wohlforth (1994/95:92) has noted, that is "rich and varied, and cannot be limited just to structural realism."
An Agenda for Realists
Our discussion and the model we have described suggest that there should be three important goals in any further development of a realist theory of institutions: (1) to elaborate the causal links among the three levels of analysis and the various dimensions of the dependent variable; (2) to deduce falsifiable hypotheses that posit precisely how the variables are causally related; and (3) to operationalize, test, and refine these propositions by means of case-study and process-tracing methods or standard quantitative/statistical techniques. The most important lines of inquiry for future research center on the following questions: How do the characteristics of states affect their interactions and vice versa? How do state-level interactions, such as alliance behavior or the degree of economic/military interdependence among states, affect the degree of institutionalization and the type of governance in the system as a whole or in a particular subsystem? Does the structure of the system affect the characteristics of its component units and, if so, in what ways? Do changes in the structure of the international system affect the type of order (imposed, negotiated, or spontaneously generated) that results? Or, conversely, does the type of order and the ways in which power is exercised (either through naked force, influence, or management) cause predictable changes in system structure and the nature of state interactions? Along these lines, Layne (1993) has argued that, because overwhelming power is inherently threatening, unipolarity impels eligible states to balance against the hegemon, regardless of whether it adopts a benevolent or coercive strategy or has a recent history of friendship and alliance with the candidates for future polar status. In other words, Layne, a self-described neorealist, is proposing that system structure (unipolarity) affects both unit-level interactions (states become more competitive and go from amity to enmity) and the attributes of the units (satisfied states become dissatisfied with the status quo and seek to revise it). The model we have described offers a competing prediction: If the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based on legitimate influence and management, lesser states will bandwagon with, rather than balance against, it. Thus, the United States may be able to prolong and strengthen its present hegemonic rule (Pax Americana) through whatJosefJoffe (1995:113) has called a "Bismarckian strategy of hubs and spokes," whereby it maintains "better relations with all possible contenders than they do among each other." To determine which scenario is most likely to unfold (Layne's or this essay's) as well as the answers to many other equally important puzzles, we must address the questions raised above.
In addition to insights concerning why international institutions are formed and maintained, we also need to explore why and by what processes institutions decay. Even though we have unresolved questions, we know far more about how institutions arise than we do about their decay and disintegration. Neoliberal institutionalism has not been of much assistance in this regard, because authors in this tradition go to the opposite extreme of neorealists and accord great staying power to institutions ( To be sure, tackling this research agenda is a daunting task but one we believe is necessary if realists are to meet the intellectual challenges of the post-Cold War world. We urge scholars to develop a new body of literature devoted to uncovering and investigating the causal links, interaction effects, and feedback loops among variables at three levels of analysis-not just two-and between these variables and the type of order in international politics that they produce. This article was intended to show the relevance of such an endeavor for understanding the nature of international institutions.
